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The Theory of Mind’s role in pronoun acquisition: 








This study’s aim is to understand how children 
learn first- and second-person singular pronouns. 
Many researchers tried to find possible connection 
between Theory of Mind (ToM) and the 
acquisition of pronouns. The ability to produce 
and comprehend first- and second-person singular 
pronouns seems closely linked with the ability to 
appreciate other people’s mental states: a lack or 
non-mature development of ToM may thus affect 
their competence in using pronouns. To strengthen 
this hypothesis we focused on the phenomenon of 
pronoun reversal, which mainly consists in the 
substitution of I for you, and you for I, testing a 
group of 17 typically developing children - 38 to 
70 months of age. Due to its pro-drop 
classification, Italian is the focus language of this 
study. The outcome showed a correlation between 
the phenomena of ToM and pronoun reversal. 
Further research should focus on the directionality 






The childhood acquisition and usage of the first person singular 
pronoun I and the second person singular pronoun you is commonly 
believed to be effortless. In order to acquire a pronoun, however, a 
child must take into account both their grammatical intrinsic 
properties (person, gender, case) and their speech roles (speaker, 
addressee, non-participant). Indeed, pronouns are expressions that 
identify specific individuals in a given speech context, but the 
individuals they identify shift according to audience or discourse 
situation, and this is the main difference between nouns and 
pronouns (Chiat 1986). One object might have different names, or 
one name might lead to multiple meanings, but the reference of the 
name does not change depending on who is speaking (Clark 1978). 
For a child who is acquiring a language this means that when the 
grandmother is around, s/he will hear the title of “grandmother” 
several times until connecting the word “grandmother” with its 
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referent. On the other hand, the same child will hear the pronoun I 
with a variety of referents and this can lead to misunderstandings.  
 As the pronoun system is difficult, children can experience a 
myriad of errors in the acquisition process. By the age of three, 
children will typically have acquired first- and second-person 
singular pronouns in full (Rozendaal & Baker 2010), following a 
pattern that is not clear-cut but seems quite predictable: at the 
beginning they acquire first-person singular and inanimate third-
person singular pronouns, and then the second-person singular 
pronoun (Chiat 1986). On the other hand, these pronouns are 
acquired and used in specific contexts, rather than in a full adult 
distribution; sometimes they are produced in unanalyzed phrases, 
like frozen sentences or formulaic speech. For example, the use of 
the first-person pronoun has been noticed in verb forms of want or 
need, like in the formula “I wanna” (Pérez-Pereira 1999:656). All 
the other pronouns emerge in a non-rigid and unestablished order 
(Chiat 1986). 
Before children can use pronouns at the same level as adults, two 
varieties of errors have been observed in literature: pronoun 
avoidance and pronoun reversal. In pronoun avoidance children, 
tend to avoid using pronouns and use proper names instead (Lee, 
Hobson & Chiat 1994). Pronoun reversal is the use of a second-
person pronoun for self-reference, and/or a first-person pronoun for 
an addressee (Chiat 1986). In other words, it is the substitution of I 
for you, and you for I, together with a more unusual inversion of 
other deictic terms and locatives (Dale & Crain 1993:574). The 
study of these errors began in 1908 (Cooley 1908) but it had 
regularly been studied in relation with Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD: Kanner 1943; Lee et al. 1994; Naigles, Cheng, Rattanasone, 
Tek, Khetrapal, Fein, & Demuth 2016; Perovic, Modyanova & 
Wexler 2013; Shield, Meier & Tager-Flusberg 2015).  
Even if the phenomenon of pronoun reversal has been studied 
mainly with a focus on impaired populations, recent studies have 
shown that difficulties in mastering pronouns also occur in typically 
developing (TD) children and even in premature talkers (Cheng 
2012; Dale & Crain 1993; Evans & Demuth 2012; Naigles et al. 
2016; Ricard, Girouard & Decarie 1999). In particular, a 2012 
longitudinal studyby Cheng, came to the conclusion that children in 
the autistic spectrum do not reverse much more than TD children, 
contrary to what had been previously claimed. However, a 
difference between TD children and ASD children exists. ASD 
children continuously reversed their pronouns until the end of the 
period of the longitudinal study, while the former showed a gradual 
decline in the reversal. Cheng’s study presented a methodological 
improvement because she selected participants randomly. Whereas 
in other literature, scholars often examined children who had 
previously been known to reverse pronouns.  
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There are several theories on the cause of pronoun reversals but 
the problem remains puzzling because a large number of children 
who reverse pronouns may also produce the correct form sometime. 
Moreover, it is a phenomenon that is not present in all children 
(Dale & Crain 1993).  
One of these generally supported theories is the phenomenon of 
echolalia. The term “echolalia” refers to the repetition of words or 
phrases that another speaker has uttered, i.e. when echolalia is 
verbatim, pronoun reversal is very common because the sentence is 
repeated exactly as heard. According to this view, “personal 
pronouns are repeated just as heard, with no change to suit the 
altered situation. [...] Not only the words, but even the intonation is 
retained.” (Kanner 1943:249). This proposal was taken up by Bartak 
and Rutter (1974) as they attempted to counter to Bettelheim’s 
(1967) data on ASD children and their tendency to use the pronoun 
you much more than the pronoun I. Bartak and Rutter considered 
that failure to use the first personal pronominal form is due to a 
combination of its usual initial sentence position and the tendency of 
some ASD children to echo only the final part of what they’ve 
heard. Recent studies, however, seem to show that children produce 
much more easily the pronoun I – often productively – and if parents 
tend to use the pronoun you more often than the pronoun I (Smiley, 
Chang & Allhoff 2011), this is in contrast with a purely echolalia-
centered view (Cheng 2012; Wechsler 2010). Moreover, echolalia 
cannot be a full explanation of pronoun-reversal since only a small 
proportion of the reversals occurred in imitative context (Dale & 
Crain 1993; Oshima-Takane 1992). Other theories of pronoun 
reversal argue that a child’s assumption is that pronouns refer to 
specific objects or persons and are treated as nouns (Charney 1980; 
Clark 1978). According to others, personal pronouns are problematic 
for all children and some of them simply avoid to use pronouns at 
first, opting for a more nominal style (Dale & Crain 1993).  
Currently, the most debated hypothesis on pronoun reversals is 
the one related to a lack or deficit in the Theory of Mind (ToM: 
Hobson 1990; Jordan 1989; Lee et al. 1994). ToM is the cognitive 
ability to attribute mental states to ourselves and to others and to 
consider that our beliefs or knowledge can differ from the ones of 
others (Premack & Woodruff 1978). One of the most interesting 
works on the link between ToM and pronouns acquisition is 
Wechsler (2010). The author sets out a “de se theory”, based on the 
assumption that “first- and second-person indexical pronouns 
indicate reference de se (also called self-ascription)” (Wechsler 
2010:332) instead of simply referring to "the speaker" or to "the 
addressee". In a face-to-face communication, when the speaker 
produces the first-person singular pronoun s/he is doing an act of 
self-ascription whereas the listener has to reason about the speaker’s 
act of self-ascription, and this requires ToM. The same idea is 
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behind a speaker producing the second-person singular pronoun 
since there is the need to reason about the addressee’s act of self-
ascription, thus ToM is involved. According to Wechsler, self-
ascription pronouns are acquired before ToM-related pronouns. This 
view explains why during the period before ToM has fully 
developed, there is more correct use of the first-person singular 
pronoun. Wechsler’s theory has been recently confirmed by further 
data (Köder 2016; Markova & Smolík 2014).  
The present study aims to assess the described correlation 
between ToM development and pronoun acquisition in TD children; 
on the other hand, we won’t focus on a single ToM ability, like in 
previous studies. Research has shown how ToM doesn’t develop as 
a unique and monolithic competence but rather it’s progressively 
strengthened through a predictable sequence of precursor abilities, 
such as desires, beliefs, knowledge, intentions, emotions (e.g., 
Peterson, Wellman & Slaughter 2012; Wellman & Liu 2004). 
In this context, a particularly relevant study is Wellman and Liu 
(2004), in which 75 children (aged 2 years, 11 months to 6 years, 6 
months) have been administered 7 different tasks concerning various 
aspects of understanding people’s mental states. As hypothesized by 
the authors, each child had a threshold of difficulty in which 





The goal of the present study is to show that pronoun acquisition is 
related with a lack or with a non-mature development of ToM 
(Wechsler 2010; Wellman & Liu 2004) testing a group of TD 
children on the level of ToM abilities and the presence of pronoun 
reversals. Italian is the target language of this study because the 
characteristic pronoun reversal phenomenon has never been 
examined. Italian is a pro-drop language, thus pronouns can be 
omitted if they are pragmatically inferable, and there is agreement 
between the subject pronoun and the verb. Both of these 





Participants were 17 TD children, ranging from 38 to 70 months of 
age (9 males, mean age in months 50.76, d.s. = 11.9). Children were 
recruited in kindergarten and were tested after parents’ consensus 
that Italian is their mother tongue. 
 
 
2.2 Material and procedure 
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First, children were tested with the standardized Italian version of the 
Test for Reception of Grammar (TROG-2; Bishop 2009). This test 
measures the grammatical contrasts allowing assessment of the 
understanding of verbal language, particularly the comprehension of 
grammatical structures. We tested the development of grammatical 
abilities since previous studies have demonstrated its important role in 
the use of personal reference (Markova & Smolík 2014). 
The experiment, then, was divided into two parts: 
1. The first battery of tests was a Italian version of Wellman and Liu’s 
seven tasks (2004) to assess the level of ToM.  
2. The second battery of tests assessed the level of production of first- 
and second-person pronouns and the comprehension of other pronouns 
as a control. 
 
 
2.2.1 Theory of Mind battery 
	  
To assess the level of ToM for our purposes, a single test (e.g. false 
belief task) might be reductive of the phenomenon complexity. For this 
reason, we chose an Italian translation of Wellman and Liu’s seven 
tasks (2004, see Appendix 1). These tasks aim to analyze different 
aspects of understanding people’s mental state; according to literature, 
ToM should not be considered as a single skill because it includes 
multiple capabilities, which grow sequentially in different phases and 
ages. The tasks include the following abilities, ranked by increasing 
degree of intensity: 
 
1. Diverse Desires: the ability to consider that our desires can be 
different from other people’s desires. 
2. Diverse Beliefs: the ability to consider that our beliefs can be 
different from other people’s beliefs. 
3. Knowledge Access: the ability to consider that our knowledge does 
not imply that others share the same knowledge. 
4. Contents False Belief: the ability to consider that even if we know 
something, other people may have false beliefs about the same thing. 
5. Explicit False Belief: the ability to consider that people with beliefs 
– even if false – act accordingly to those beliefs, independently from 
our knowledge.  
6. Belief – Emotion: the ability to understand, independently from our 
knowledge, that other people’s emotions are coherent with their belief, 
even if the belief is false.  





2.2.2 Pronouns battery 
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This second battery of tests assesses the level of production of first- and 
second-person singular pronouns. There are three tasks: in the first test, 
pronouns will be produced with the verbs to check their agreement, in 
the second, they will be uttered in isolation (focus position), and the 




1. Pronouns-verbs task 
 
The child and the experimenter are seated at a table, opposite 
one another. On the table there are two bunches of cards laid face 
down. There are 10 cards in one bunch, 5 cards with the name of the 
experimenter and 5 with the name of the child. The other bunch 
consists of 10 pictures of objects and things that a person would 
normally bring to a party (e.g. a stereo, a bottle of coke, a cake, a 
present, flowers etc.).  
The experimenter says to the child: “Imagine that this evening 
we are going to a birthday party. We must bring something to help our 
friend. Now we decide who brings what, choosing a card from the first 
bunch in which there is the name of the person and one from the bunch 
with the object to bring. Then, say loudly who has to bring what!”. The 
experimenter should never produce the pronouns you or I. If needed, a 
teacher should help the child reading the names on the card and naming 
the objects.  
In a situation in which the child picks up the card with his/her 
name and a card with a picture of a cake, we should expect that the 
child produces the pronoun and verb, saying something like “Io porto la 
torta” [I bring -1p.sg- the cake] if s/he is right or, for example, “Tu 
porti la torta” [You bring -2p.sg- the cake] or “Tu porto la torta” [You 
bring -1p.sg- the cake] if s/he reverses the pronoun. At the conclusion 
of the task, every child should have elicited 10 sentences, 5 with the 
first-person singular pronoun and 5 with the second-person singular 
pronoun. In every sentence there should be a verb, with or without 
agreement.  
In this first task, the pronoun is produced in a non-focus 
position and it is created to verify the correlation between the pronoun 
and the verb. It is necessary to have such a task because in a situation in 
which the child produces the null pronoun, we cannot know whether 
that subject pronoun would agree with the verb. In other words, a child 
can say “sono stato al mare” (null pronoun - [have been -1p sg]- at the 
sea); however it is impossible to establish whether – in case he would 
have elicited the pronoun – he would say “io sono stato al mare” (I - 
[have been -1p sg]- at the sea) or “tu sono stato al mare” (You - [have 
been-1p sg] - at the sea). 
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2. Pronouns in isolation task 
 
The second test is thematically structured like the previous one. 
Following the first test, the child has a bunch of cards with pictures of 
the object that s/he is supposed to bring to the party. Distant from the 
child – but still in view – there are the cards of the experimenter. The 
experimenter has to simulate a phone-call saying that s/he had forgotten 
what s/he has to bring at the party while posing questions to the child. 
For example, the experimenter asks "Who should bring the cake?”. The 
child then has to answer, saying only "I" or "you", while checking the 
card bunches in front of him/her.  
 
 
3. Tasks on other pronouns  
 
The last test is a Picture Selection Task. This test assesses the 
competence of the speaker in understanding 3rd-person singular and 
plural pronouns and 1st- and 2nd-plural pronouns. The child has to point 
at one of two pictures that better matches a sentence. For example, if 
there are two pictures, one with a little girl eating an ice cream and one 





First, we looked at the general production of pronouns. The correct 
form of the first-person singular pronouns was produced 84.12% of the 
times (SD = 23.47). The correct form of the second-person singular 
pronouns was produced 68.12% of the times (SD = 37.24). The correct 
form of the other pronouns was produced 84.71% of the times (SD = 
13.28).  
Then, we analyzed results from the ToM and the pronouns 
battery. For the first test, we coded an incorrect answer as 0 and a 
correct answer as 1. At the end, we had results from the seven single 
tasks and a final ToM score obtained by adding the points obtained 
during the single tasks.  
For the pronouns battery, we attributed one point for every pronoun 
produced correctly, dividing the results for the first-person singular 
pronouns, the second-person singular pronouns and the other pronouns. 
Since there were no cases in which the pronoun mismatched the verb – 
even when the pronoun was reversed – for the pronouns-verbs task we 
did not consider the agreement but only the correctness of the produced 
pronoun.  
We looked to see if there was a positive correlation between the 
verbal mental age (grammatical) and the total ToM score. We expected 
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a positive correlation since the verbal mental age should increase with 
age in TD children (this has been confirmed: r = .854, p < .001) and 
ToM abilities develop with age too; a Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient has been computed and confirmed a positive 
correlation between the verbal mental age (M = 55.71, SD = 15.36) and 
the total score obtained in the ToM task (M = 3.71, SD = 1.83), r = 
.704, p = .001. Moreover, both the chronological age (Cage) and the 
verbal mental age (VMAge) for grammatical development correlates 
with the production of first-person singular pronoun (Cage: r = .542, p = 
.02; VMAge: r = .641, p = .006) and second-person singular pronoun 
(Cage: r = .728, p = .001; VMAge: r = .613, p = .009) but not with the 
comprehension of the other pronouns (Cage: r < .001, p = .999; VMAge:  
r = .117, p = .654).  
Then, we checked if the ToM total score was positively 
correlated with the score obtained in pronouns task. Since 
chronological age correlates with both pronoun-production and ToM, 
we conducted a Pearson partial correlation, controlling for age. ToM 
correlates only with second-person singular pronouns but not with the 
other pronouns and it approached significance with the first-person 
singular pronoun (1st and 2nd person plural and 3rd person singular 
and plural), 1st: r = .451, p = .08; 2nd: r = .632, p = .009; Others: r = 
.091, p = .737.  
Since a correlation between the ToM total score and pronouns 
was found and ToM tasks are structured with a growing degree of 
complexity, we checked whether all ToM abilities correlate with first- 
and second-person singular pronouns production or if only the most 
complex ones correlate. Again, we controlled for age. As shown in 
Table 1, we found that a lack in understanding explicit false belief (r = 
.572, p = .02) and a lack in the comprehension that emotion can be 
simulated (r = .551, p = .03) are related to the production of the second-
person singular pronoun. There are no correlations between ToM 
abilities and the comprehension of either the first-person singular 
pronoun or the other pronouns.  
 









.384 -.045 .140 
ToM Diverse 
Beliefs 
.111 .220 .167 
ToM 
Knowledge 
-.182 -.005 .406 
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Table 1. Pearson’s correlation results for the ToM tasks (Wellman & 




Recent studies show that pronoun reversal is an error that is present in 
both ASD and TD children, although in the latter it disappears rapidly 
(Cheng 2012). The fact that TD children stop reversing earlier, led to 
the supposition that ToM may have a role in mastering first- and 
second-person singular pronouns, since it is well known that ASD 
children experience problems in ToM development. The present study 
was designed to verify whether the pronoun reversal phenomenon was 
present in TD children, and whether the acquisition of personal 
pronouns may have some correlation with the development of ToM.  
First, our results confirmed that first-person singular pronouns 
are mastered before second-person singular pronouns (Charney 1980; 
Cheng 2012; Chiat 1986; Smiley et al. 2011). Second, our results also 
confirmed that the production of both pronouns correlates with 
language abilities, particularly grammatical abilities. According to 
Wechsler (2012), our results confirmed a stronger correlation between 
ToM and the mastering of second-person singular pronoun production. 
It seems that ToM does not have a role in the production of the pronoun 
I, whereas the production of the pronoun you relates to a developed 
ToM, with its understanding of explicit false belief and with the 
comprehension that emotion can be simulated.  
Similar results were obtained in a recent study made by 
Markova and Smolík (2014) on another pro-drop language: Czech. 
These researchers, throughout maternal reports, found correlations both 
between language abilities (i.e., grammatical development) and the use 
of first- and second-person singular pronouns. Furthermore, they found 
a correlation between the use of second-person singular pronouns – but 
not of first-person reference – and the use of mental state verbs 




.162 .216 .151 
ToM Explicit 
False Belief 
.371 .572* -.283 
ToM Belief 
Emotion 




.296 .551* -.223 
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Finally, we confirmed that pronoun reversal also occurs in TD 
children. We discovered that the verb generally agrees with the 
reversed pronoun and indeed in our study no participants produced a 
verb agreement mismatched with the related pronoun. Overall, results 
seem to support the ToM hypothesis on pronoun reversal. On the other 
hand, we should consider all research on reversed pronouns in echolalic 
contexts. If we consider the fact that TD and ASD children invert with 
almost the same frequency but the latter, contrary to the former, 
continue to reverse also at the end of the trial period (Cheng 2012), we 
may ask what TD and ASD have in common during the period in 
which they both reverse pronouns. A possible answer is that they both 
have a non-mature ToM and we might thus speculate about a relation 
between echolalia and a non-mature ToM. For example, echolalia can 
be a strategy children use when ToM is not useful. If this is the case, 
our two hypotheses will be streamlined into one hypothesis. Future 
research should focus on a possible correlation between echolalia and 
ToM, studying both the production and comprehension of pronouns. 
The research could also search for similarities and differences in the 
mastering of pronouns between TD and ASD children in a pro-drop 






Bartak, Lawrence & Michael Rutter. 1974. The use of personal 
pronouns by autistic children. Journal of Autism and Childhood 
Schizophrenia 4(3). 217-222. 
Bettelheim, Bruno. 1967. Empty fortress. Simon and Schuster 
Bishop, Dorothy V. M. 2009. TROG 2: Test for Reception of 
Grammar-Version 2. Edizioni Giunti OS, Firenze. 
Brehme, David. 2014. Perspectives on Personal Pronoun Reversal in 
Children with ASD: A Critical Review. Journal of European 
Psychology Students 5.(1). 
Charney, Rosalind. 1980. Pronoun errors in autistic children: Support 
for a social explanation. International Journal of Language & 
Communication Disorders 15(1). 39-43. 
Cheng, Michelle. 2012. Longitudinal Changes in Pronoun Reversals in 




Chiat, Shula. 1986. Personal pronouns. In Fletcher, Paul, & Michael 
Garman (Eds.), Language acquisition: studies in first language 
MAZZAGGIO: THE THEORY OF MIND’S ROLE IN PRONOUN ACQUISITION 
	  
	  
	   65 
acquisition, 2nd Ed., 339-355. Cambridge University Press, 
New York. 
Clark, Eve V. 1978. From gesture to word: On the natural history of 
deixis in language acquisition. Human Growth and 
Development, 85-120. 
Cooley, Charles H. 1908. A study of the early use of self-words by a 
child. Psychological Review 15(6). 339-357. 
Dale, Philip S. & Catherine Crain-Thoreson. 1993. Pronoun reversals: 
who, when, and why?. Journal of Child Language 20(03). 573-
589. 
Evans, Karen E. & Katherine Demuth. 2012. Individual differences in 
pronoun reversal: Evidence from two longitudinal case studies. 
Journal of child language 39(01). 162-191. 
Hobson, R. Peter. 1990. On the origins of self and the case of autism. 
Development and Psychopathology 2(02). 163-181. 
Jordan, Rita R. 1989. An experimental comparison of the 
understanding and use of speaker‐addressee personal pronouns 
in autistic children. International Journal of Language & 
Communication Disorders 24(2).169-179. 
Kanner, Leo. 1943. Autistic disturbances of affective contact. Nervous 
Child. 217-250. 
Köder, Franziska Maria. 2016. Between direct and indirect speech: The 
acquisition of pronouns in reported speech. PhD thesis. 
Groningen: University of Groningen. 
Lee, Anthony, Peter R. Hobson & Shulamuth Chiat. 1994. I, you, me, 
and autism: An experimental study. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders 24.(2). 155-176. 
Naigles, Letitia R., Cheng Michelle, Rattanasone Nan Xu, Tek Saime, 
Khetrapal Neha, Fein Deborah & Demuth Katherine. 2016. 
“You’re telling me!” The prevalence and predictors of pronoun 
reversals in children with autism spectrum disorders and typical 
development. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders 27. 11-
20. 
Markova, Gabriela & Filip Smolík. 2014. What do you think? The 
relationship between person reference and communication about 
the mind in toddlers. Social Development 23(01). 61-79. 
Oshima-Takane, Yuriko. 1992. Analysis of pronominal errors: A case-
study. Journal of Child Language 19(01). 111-131. 
Perez-Pereira, Miguel. 1999. Deixis, personal reference, and the use of 
pronouns by blind children. Journal of Child Language 26(03). 
655-680. 
Perovic, Alexandra, Nadya Modyanova & Ken Wexler. 2013. 
Comprehension of reflexive and personal pronouns in children 
with autism: A syntactic or pragmatic deficit?. Applied 
Psycholinguistics 34(04). 813-835. 
Peterson, Candida C., Henry M. Wellman & Virginia Slaughter. 2012. 
The mind behind the message: Advancing theory‐of‐mind scales 
STUDIES IN THE LINGUISTIC SCIENCES 2016 
	  
	   66 
for typically developing children, and those with deafness, 
autism, or Asperger syndrome. Child development 83(2). 469-
485. 
Premack, David & Guy Woodruff. 1978. Does the chimpanzee have a 
theory of mind?. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 1(04). 515-
526. 
Ricard, Marcelle, Pascale C. Girouard & Therese Gouin Decarie. 1999. 
Personal pronouns and perspective taking in toddlers. Journal of 
Child Language 26(03). 681-697. 
Rozendaal, Margot & Anne Baker. 2010. The acquisition of reference: 
Pragmatic aspects and the influence of language input. Journal 
of Pragmatics 42(7). 1866-1879. 
Shield, Aaron, Richard P. Meier & Helen Tager-Flusberg. 2015. The 
use of sign language pronouns by native-signing children with 
autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 45(7). 
2128-2145. 
Smiley, Patricia A., Lillian Ku Chang & Anne K. Allhoff. 2011. Can 
Toddy give me an orange? Parent input and young children's 
production of I and you. Language Learning and Development 
7(2). 77-106. 
Wechsler, Stephen. 2010. What 'you' and 'I' mean to each other: Person 
indexicals, self-ascription, and theory of mind. Language 86(2). 
332-365. 
Wellman, Henry M. & David Liu. 2004. Scaling of theory‐of‐mind 




Appendix 1: ToM tasks (Wellmann & Liu, 2004, pp.538-539) 
 
1. Diverse Desires 
 
Children see a toy figure of an adult and a sheet of paper with a carrot 
and a cookie drawn on it. ‘‘Here’s Mr. Jones. It’s snack time, so, Mr. 
Jones wants a snack to eat. Here are two different snacks: a carrot and a 
cookie. Which snack would you like best? Would you like a carrot or a 
cookie best?’’ This is the own-desire question. If the child chooses the 
carrot: ‘‘Well, that’s a good choice, but Mr. Jones really likes cookies. 
He doesn’t like carrots. What he likes best are cookies.’’ (Or, if the 
child chooses the cookie, he or she is told Mr. Jones likes carrots.) 
Then the child is asked the target question: ‘‘So, now it’s time to eat. 
Mr. Jones can only choose one snack, just one. Which snack will Mr. 
Jones choose? A carrot or a cookie?’’ To be scored as correct, or to 
pass this task, the child must answer the target question opposite from 
his or her answer to the own-desire question.  
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2. Diverse Beliefs 
 
Children see a toy figure of a girl and a sheet of paper with bushes and 
a garage drawn on it. ‘‘Here’s Linda. Linda wants to find her cat. Her 
cat might be hiding in the bushes or it might be hiding in the garage. 
Where do you think the cat is? In the bushes or in the garage?’’ This is 
the own-belief question. If the child chooses the bushes: ‘‘Well, that’s a 
good idea, but Linda thinks her cat is in the garage. She thinks her cat 
is in the garage.’’ (Or, if the child chooses the garage, he or she is told 
Linda thinks her cat is in the bushes.) Then the child is asked the target 
question: ‘‘So where will Linda look for her cat? In the bushes or in the 
garage?’’ To be correct the child must answer the target question 
opposite from his or her answer to the own-belief question. 
 
3. Knowledge Access 
 
Children see a nondescript plastic box with a drawer containing a small 
plastic toy dog inside the closed drawer. ‘‘Here’s a drawer. What do 
you think is inside the drawer?’’ (The child can give any answer he or 
she likes or indicate that he or she does not know). Next, the drawer is 
opened and the child is shown the content of the drawer: ‘‘Let’s 
see…it’s really a dog inside!’’ Close the drawer: ‘‘Okay, what is in the 
drawer?’’ Then a toy figure of a girl is produced: ‘‘Polly has never ever 
seen inside this drawer. Now here comes Polly. So, does Polly know 
what is in the drawer? (the target question) ‘‘Did Polly see inside this 
drawer?’’ (the memory question). To be correct the child must answer 
the target question ‘‘no’’ and answer the memory control question 
‘‘no.’’. 
 
4. Contents False Belief 
 
The child sees a clearly identifiable Band-Aid box with a plastic toy pig 
inside the closed Band-Aid box. ‘‘Here’s a Band-Aid box. What do you 
think is inside the Band-Aid box?’’ Next, the Band-Aid box is opened: 
‘‘Let’s see … it’s really a pig inside!’’ The Band-Aid box is closed: 
‘‘Okay, what is in the Band Aid box?’’ Then a toy figure of a boy is 
produced: ‘‘Peter has never ever seen inside this Band-Aid box. Now 
here comes Peter. So, what does Peter think is in the box? Band-Aids 
or a pig? (the target question) ‘‘Did Peter see inside this box?’’ (the 
memory question). To be correct the child must answer the target 
question ‘‘Band-Aids’’ and answer the memory question “no”. 
 
5. Explicit False Belief 
 
Children see a toy figure of a boy and a sheet of paper with a backpack 
and a closet drawn on it. ‘‘Here’s Scott. Scott wants to find his mittens. 
His mittens might be in his backpack or they might be in the closet. 
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Really, Scott’s mittens are in his backpack. But Scott thinks his mittens 
are in the closet.’’ ‘‘So, where will Scott look for his mittens? In his 
backpack or in the closet?’’ (the target question) ‘‘Where are Scott’s 
mittens really? In his backpack or in the closet?’’ (the reality question). 
To be correct the child must answer the target question ‘‘closet’’ and 
answer the reality question ‘‘backpack’’. 
 
6. Belief – Emotion 
 
Children see a toy figure of a boy and a clearly identifiable individual-
size Cheerios box with rocks inside the closed box. ‘‘Here is a Cheerios 
box and here is Teddy. What do you think is inside the Cheerios box?’’ 
(Cheerios) Then the adult makes Teddy speak: ‘‘Teddy says, ‘Oh good, 
because I love Cheerios. Cheerios are my favorite snack. Now I’ll go 
play.’’’ Teddy is then put away and out of sight. Next, the Cheerios box 
is opened and the contents are shown to the child: ‘‘Let’s see, there are 
really rocks inside and no Cheerios! There’s nothing but rocks.’’ The 
Cheerios box is closed: ‘‘Okay, what is Teddy’s favorite snack?’’ 
(Cheerios). Then Teddy comes back: ‘‘Teddy has never ever seen 
inside this box. Now here comes Teddy. Teddy’s back and it’s snack 
time. Let’s give Teddy this box. So, how does Teddy feel when he gets 
this box? Happy or sad?’’ (the target question) The adult opens the 
Cheerios box and lets the toy figure look inside: ‘‘How does Teddy feel 
after he looks inside the box? Happy or sad?’’ (the emotion-control 
question). To be correct, the child must answer the target question 
‘‘happy’’ and answer the emotion-control question ‘‘sad’’. 
 
7. Real – Apparent Emotion 
 
Initially, children see a sheet of paper with three faces drawn on it - a 
happy, a neutral, and a sad face - to check that the child knows these 
emotional expressions. Then that paper is put aside, and the task begins 
with the child being shown a cardboard cutout figure of a boy drawn 
from the back so that the boy’s facial expression cannot be seen. ‘‘This 
story is about a boy. I’m going to ask you about how the boy really 
feels inside and how he looks on his face. He might really feel one way 
inside but look a different way on his face. Or, he might really feel the 
same way inside as he looks on his face. I want you to tell me how he 
really feels inside and how he looks on his face.’’ ‘‘This story is about 
Matt. Matt’s friends were playing together and telling jokes. One of the 
older children, Rosie, told a mean joke about Matt and everyone 
laughed. Everyone thought it was very funny, but not Matt. But, Matt 
didn’t want the other children to see how he felt about the joke, because 
they would call him a baby. So, Matt tried to hide how he felt.’’ Then 
the child gets two memory checks: ‘‘What did the other children do 
when Rosie told a mean joke about Matt?’’ (Laughed or thought it was 
funny.) ‘‘In the story, what would the other children do if they knew 
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how Matt felt?’’ (Call Matt a baby or tease him.) Pointing to the three 
emotion pictures: ‘‘So, how did Matt really feel, when everyone 
laughed? Did he feel happy, sad, or okay?’’ (the target-feel question) 
‘‘How did Matt try to look on his face, when everyone laughed? Did he 
look happy, sad, or okay? (the target-look question). To be correct the 
child’s answer to the target-feel question must be more negative than 
his or her answer to the target-look question (i.e., sad for target-feel and 
happy or okay for target-look, or okay for target-feel and happy for 
target-look). 
 
 
